Technology could be used to improve morality but it could do so in different ways. Some technologies could augment and enhance moral behaviour externally by using external cues and signals to push and pull us towards ... more abstractTechnology could be used to improve morality but it could do so in different ways. Some technologies could augment and enhance moral behaviour externally by using external cues and signals to push and pull us towards morally appropriate behaviours. Other technologies could enhance moral behaviour internally by directly altering the way in which the brain captures and processes morally salient information or initiates moral action. The question is whether there is any reason to prefer one method over the other? In this article, I argue that there is. Specifically, I argue that internal moral enhancement is likely to be preferable to external moral enhancement, when it comes to the legitimacy of political decision-making processes. In fact, I go further than this and argue that the increasingly dominant forms of external moral enhancement (algorithm-assisted enhancement) may already be posing a significant threat to political legitimacy, one that we should try to address. Consequently, research and development of internal moral enhancements should be prioritised as a political project.

Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Political Philosophy, Ethics, Applied Ethics, and 8 more

It is widely believed that a conservative moral outlook is opposed to biomedical forms of human enhancement. In this paper, I argue that this widespread belief is incorrect. Using Cohen’s evaluative conservatism as my... more abstractIt is widely believed that a conservative moral outlook is opposed to biomedical forms of human enhancement. In this paper, I argue that this widespread belief is incorrect. Using Cohen’s evaluative conservatism as my starting point, I argue that there are strong conservative reasons to prioritise the development of biomedical enhancements. In particular, I suggest that biomedical enhancement may be essential if we are to maintain our current evaluative equilibrium (i.e. the set of values that undergird and permeate our current political, economic, and personal lives) against the threats to that equilibrium posed by external, non-biomedical forms of enhancement. I defend this view against modest conservatives who insist that biomedical enhancements pose a greater risk to our current evaluative equilibrium, and against those who see no principled distinction between the forms of human enhancement.

Medical Sciences, Economics, Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Ethics, and 19 more

Journal Name: Journal of Medical Ethics

Publication Name: An Evaluative Conservative Case for Biomedical Enhancement

Are universities justified in trying to regulate student use of cognitive enhancing drugs? In this paper I argue that they can be, but that the most appropriate kind of regulatory intervention is likely to be voluntar... more abstractAre universities justified in trying to regulate student use of cognitive enhancing drugs? In this paper I argue that they can be, but that the most appropriate kind of regulatory intervention is likely to be voluntary in nature. To be precise, I argue that universities could justifiably adopt a commitment contract system of regulation wherein students are encouraged to voluntarily commit to not using cognitive enhancing drugs (or to using them in a specific way). If they are found to breach that commitment, they should be penalised by, for example, forfeiting a number of marks on their assessments. To defend this model of regulation, I adopt a recently-proposed evaluative framework for determining the appropriateness of enhancement in specific domains of activity, and I focus on particular existing types of cognitive enhancement drugs, not hypothetical or potential forms. In this way, my argument is tailored to the specific features of university education, and common patterns of usage among students. It is not concerned with the general ethical propriety of using cognitive enhancing drugs.

Ethics, Applied Ethics, Education, Educational Technology, Bioethics, and 12 more

Journal Name: Bioethics

We are living through an era of increased robotisation. Some authors have already begun to explore the impact of this robotisation on legal rules and practice. In doing so, many highlight potential liability gaps that... more abstractWe are living through an era of increased robotisation. Some authors have already begun to explore the impact of this robotisation on legal rules and practice. In doing so, many highlight potential liability gaps that might arise through robot misbehaviour. Although these gaps are interesting and socially significant, they do not exhaust the possible gaps that might be created by increased robotisation. In this article, I make the case for one of those alternative gaps: the retribution gap. This gap arises from a mismatch between the human desire for retribution and the absence of appropriate subjects of retributive blame. I argue for the potential existence of this gap in an era of increased robotisation; suggest that it is much harder to plug this gap than it is to plug those thus far explored in the literature; and then highlight three important social implications of this gap.

Robotics, Criminology, Psychology, Social Psychology, Artificial Intelligence, and 20 more

Journal Name: Ethics and Information Technology

Suppose we are about to enter an era of increasing technological unemployment. What implications does this have for society? Two distinct ethical/social issues would seem to arise. The first is one of distributive jus... more abstractSuppose we are about to enter an era of increasing technological unemployment. What implications does this have for society? Two distinct ethical/social issues would seem to arise. The first is one of distributive justice: how will the (presumed) efficiency gains from automated labour be distributed through society? The second is one of personal fulfillment and meaning: if people no longer have to work, what will they do with their lives? In this article, I set aside the first issue and focus on the second. In doing so, I make three arguments. First, I argue that there are good reasons to embrace non-work and that these reasons become more compelling in an era of technological unemployment. Second, I argue that the technological advances that make widespread technological unemployment possible could still threaten or undermine human flourishing and meaning, especially if (as is to be expected) they do not remain confined to the economic sphere. And third, I argue that this threat could be contained if we adopt an integrative approach to our relationship with technology. In advancing these arguments, I draw on three distinct literatures: (i) the literature on technological unemployment and workplace automation; (ii) the antiwork critique — which I argue gives reasons to embrace technological unemployment; and (iii) the philosophical debate about the conditions for meaning in life — which I argue gives reasons for concern.

Information Technology, Economics, Political Philosophy, Ethics, Philosophy of Science, and 12 more

Journal Name: Science and Engineering Ethics

One of the most noticeable trends in recent years has been the increasing reliance of public decision-making processes (bureaucratic, legislative and legal) on algorithms, i.e. computer programmed step-by-step instruc... more abstractOne of the most noticeable trends in recent years has been the increasing reliance of public decision-making processes (bureaucratic, legislative and legal) on algorithms, i.e. computer programmed step-by-step instructions for taking a given set of inputs and producing an output. The question raised by this article is whether the rise of such algorithmic governance creates problems for the moral or political legitimacy of our public decision-making processes. Ignoring common concerns with data protection and privacy, it is argued that algorithm-driven decision-making does pose a significant threat to the legitimacy of such processes. Modeling my argument on Estlund’s threat of epistocracy, I call this the ‘threat of algocracy’. The article clarifies the nature of this threat, and addresses two possible solutions (named, respectively, “resistance” and “accommodation”). It is argued that neither solution is likely to be successful, at least not without risking many other things we value about social decision-making. The result is a somewhat pessimistic conclusion in which we confront the possibility that we are creating decision-making processes that constrain and limit opportunities for human participation.

Information Systems, Bioengineering, Computer Science, Algorithms, Artificial Intelligence, and 41 more

Publisher: Springer

Journal Name: Philosophy and Technology DOI: 10.1007/s13347-015-0211-1

This paper tries to clarify, strengthen and respond to two prominent objections to the development and use of human enhancement technologies. Both objections express concerns about the link between enhancement and the... more abstractThis paper tries to clarify, strengthen and respond to two prominent objections to the development and use of human enhancement technologies. Both objections express concerns about the link between enhancement and the drive for hyperagency (i.e. the ability to control and manipulate all aspects of one’s agency). The first derives from the work of Sandel and Hauskeller and is concerned with the negative impact of hyperagency on social solidarity. In responding to their objection, I argue that although social solidarity is valuable, there is a danger in overestimating its value and in neglecting some obvious ways in which the enhancement project can be planned so as to avoid its degradation. The second objection, though common to several writers, has been most directly asserted by Saskia Nagel, and is concerned with the impact of hyperagency on the burden and distribution of responsibility. Though this is an intriguing objection, I argue that not enough has been done to explain why such alterations are morally problematic. I try to correct for this flaw before offering a variety of strategies for dealing with the problems raised.

Psychology, Personality Psychology, Law, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, and 13 more

Publication Name: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice

The meaning of an utterance is often enriched by the pragmatic context in which it is uttered. This is because in ordinary conversations we routinely and uncontroversially compress what we say, safe in the knowledge t... more abstractThe meaning of an utterance is often enriched by the pragmatic context in which it is uttered. This is because in ordinary conversations we routinely and uncontroversially compress what we say, safe in the knowledge that those interpreting us will “add in” the content we intend to communicate. Does the same thing hold true in the case of legal utterances like “This constitution protects the personal rights of the citizen” or “the parliament shall have the power to lay and collect taxes”? This article addresses this question from the perspective of the constitutional originalist — the person who holds that the meaning of a constitutional text is fixed at some historical moment. In doing so, it advances four theses. First, it argues that every originalist theory is committed to some degree of pragmatic enrichment, the debate is about how much (enrichment thesis). Second, that in determining which content gets “added in”, originalists typically hold to a common knowledge standard for enrichment, protestations to the contrary notwithstanding (common knowledge thesis). Third, that the common knowledge standard for enrichment is deeply flawed (anti-CK thesis). And fourth, that all of this leads us to a thin theory of original constitutional meaning — similar to that defended by Jack Balkin and Ronald Dworkin — not for moral reasons but for strictly semantic ones (thinness thesis). Although some of the theses are extant in the literature, this article tries to defend them in a novel and perspicuous way.

Law, Constitutional Law, Philosophy, Pragmatics, Semantics, and 13 more

Publication Name: Jurisprudence

An advanced artificial intelligence (a “superintelligence”) could pose a significant existential risk to humanity. Several research institutes have been set-up to address those risks. And there is an increasing number... more abstractAn advanced artificial intelligence (a “superintelligence”) could pose a significant existential risk to humanity. Several research institutes have been set-up to address those risks. And there is an increasing number of academic publications analysing and evaluating their seriousness. Nick Bostrom’s Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies represents the apotheosis of this trend. In this article, I argue that in defending the credibility of AI risk, Bostrom makes an epistemic move that is analogous to one made by so-called sceptical theists in the debate about the existence of God. And while this analogy is interesting in its own right, what is more interesting is its potential implication. It has been repeatedly argued that sceptical theism has devastating effects on our beliefs and practices. Could it be that AI-doomsaying has similar effects? I argue that it could. Specifically, and somewhat paradoxically, I argue that it could lead to either a reductio of the doomsayers position, or an important and additional reason to join their cause. I use this paradox to suggest that the modal standards for argument in the superintelligence debate need to be addressed.

Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Ethics, Philosophy of Science, and 8 more

Publication Date: 2015

Publication Name: Minds and Machines DOI: 10.1007/s11023-015-9365-y

The debate over the merits of originalism has advanced considerably in recent years, both in terms of its intellectual sophistication and its practical significance. In the process, some prominent originalists — Lawre... more abstractThe debate over the merits of originalism has advanced considerably in recent years, both in terms of its intellectual sophistication and its practical significance. In the process, some prominent originalists — Lawrence Solum and Jeffrey Goldsworthy being the two discussed here — have been at pains to separate out the linguistic and normative components of the theory. For these authors, while it is true that judges and other legal decision-makers ought to be originalists, it is also true that the communicated content of the constitution is its original meaning. That is to say: the meaning is what it is, not what it should be. Accordingly, there is no sense in which the communicated content of the constitution is determined by reference to moral desiderata; linguistic desiderata do all the work. In this article I beg to differ. In advancing their arguments for linguistic originalism, both authors rely upon the notion of successful communications conditions. In doing so they implicitly open up the door for moral desiderata to play a role in determining the original communicated content. This undercuts their claim and changes considerably the dialectical role of linguistic originalism in the debate over constitutional interpretation.

Law, Constitutional Law, Philosophy, Philosophy Of Language, Pragmatics, and 9 more

Publication Date: 2015

Publication Name: Law and Philosophy DOI: 10.1007/s10982-015-9227-z

In September 2015 a well-publicised Campaign Against Sex Robots (CASR) was launched. Modelled on the longer-standing Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, the CASR opposes the development of sex robots on the grounds that ... more abstractIn September 2015 a well-publicised Campaign Against Sex Robots (CASR) was launched. Modelled on the longer-standing Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, the CASR opposes the development of sex robots on the grounds that the technology is being developed with a particular model of female-male relations (the prostitute-john model) in mind, and that this will prove harmful in various ways. In this chapter, we consider carefully the merits of campaigning against such a technology. We make three main arguments. First, we argue that the particular claims advanced by the CASR are unpersuasive, partly due to a lack of clarity about the campaign’s aims and partly due to substantive defects in the main ethical objections put forward by campaign’s founder(s). Second, broadening our inquiry beyond the arguments proferred by the campaign itself, we argue that it would be very difficult to endorse a general campaign against sex robots unless one embraced a highly conservative attitude towards the ethics of sex, which is likely to be unpalatable to those who are active in the campaign. In making this argument we draw upon lessons from the campaign against killer robots. Finally, we conclude by suggesting that although a generalised campaign against sex robots is unwarranted, there are legitimate concerns that one can raise about the development of sex robots.

Business Ethics, Robotics, Cultural History, Economic History, Sociology, and 168 more

More Info: Danaher, J., Earp, B. D., & Sandberg, A. (forthcoming). Should we campaign against sex robots? In J. Danaher & N. McArthur (Eds.) Sex Robots: Social, Legal and Ethical Implications [working title]. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Publication Date: 2017

Memory Detection Tests (MDTs) are a general class of psychophysiological tests that can be used to determine whether someone remembers a particular fact or datum. The P300 MDT is a type of MDT that relies on a presume... more abstractMemory Detection Tests (MDTs) are a general class of psychophysiological tests that can be used to determine whether someone remembers a particular fact or datum. The P300 MDT is a type of MDT that relies on a presumed correlation between the presence of a detectable neural signal (the P300 “brainwave”) in a test subject, and the recognition of those facts in the subject’s mind. As such, the P300 MDT belongs to a class of brain-based forensic technologies which have proved popular and controversial in recent years. With such tests increasingly being proffered for use in the courtroom — to either support or call into question testimony — it would behoove the legal system to have some systematic framework for ensuring that they are used responsibly. In this paper, I defend one such framework for ensuring that this is the case: the legitimacy enhancing test. According to this test, it is appropriate to make use of technologies such as the P300 MDT whenever doing so would (probably) enhance the legitimacy of the trial. I argue that this test addresses tensions between scientific and legal norms of evidence, and exhibits a number of additional virtues including unification, simplicity and flexibility. Although the test is defended by considering the example of the P300 MDT, its significance is much broader than that. If it has the virtues I claim for it, it should provide a general framework for the responsible use of technologies, and the responsible innovation of social epistemic systems.

Forensic Science, Law of evidence, Neuroethics, Social Epistemology, P300, and 2 more

Publication Name: Van den Hoven et al (Eds) Responsible Innovation Volume II (Dordrecht: Springer, forthcoming)

Should agents be held criminally responsible for the consequences of failing to make use of enhancement technologies? This chapter argues that they should, provided such technologies would have allowed them to avoid t... more abstractShould agents be held criminally responsible for the consequences of failing to make use of enhancement technologies? This chapter argues that they should, provided such technologies would have allowed them to avoid the risks associated with a state of abnormal agency. The argument comes in three parts. First, the current position with respect to abnormal agents in the criminal law is discussed. As is made clear, we are usually quite willing to hold abnormal agents criminally responsible for their acts, provided certain conditions are met, but traditional capacitarian theories of criminal responsibility fail to account for and justify this willingness. Second, a theory of criminal responsibility – the distributive theory – is presented that does account for and justifies this willingness. And third, this theory is applied specifically to the use of enhancement technologies to avoid states of abnormal agency.

Criminal Law, Criminal Justice, Political Philosophy, Distributive Justice, Human Enhancement, and 2 more

Publication Date: 2013

Publication Name: Cognitive Enhancement: an Interdisciplinary Perspective

This was a handout for my law and ethics module. It looked at the debate about the legalisation of prostitution and the ethics of sexual labour.

Ethics, Philosophy Of Law, Philosophy of Criminal Law, Sex Work, and Prostitution

This was a handout for my law and ethics module. It looked at various arguments for and against the legalisation of drugs.

Ethics, Philosophy Of Law, Philosophy of Criminal Law, Drugs, and Criminalization

This was a handout for my law and economics module. This one tried to show how economic concepts could be applied to different types of evidence, specifically scientific evidence and the evidence from interrogational ... more abstractThis was a handout for my law and economics module. This one tried to show how economic concepts could be applied to different types of evidence, specifically scientific evidence and the evidence from interrogational torture.

Economics, Ethics, Philosophy Of Law, Law and Economics, and Scientific Evidence

This was a handout for my module on law and economics. It looked at pre-trial bargaining (in the so-called "shadow of the law") and signalling theory. The handout tries to illustrate key concepts through a series of ... more abstractThis was a handout for my module on law and economics. It looked at pre-trial bargaining (in the so-called "shadow of the law") and signalling theory. The handout tries to illustrate key concepts through a series of duel-type games. These games were actually played in class.

Economics, Philosophy Of Law, Law and Economics, Plea Bargaining, Bargaining Theory, and 1 more

This is a handout for one of the sessions in my law and economics module. This session looked at economic theories of criminal behaviour, specifically at the notion of a rational criminal and the critiques of that not... more abstractThis is a handout for one of the sessions in my law and economics module. This session looked at economic theories of criminal behaviour, specifically at the notion of a rational criminal and the critiques of that notion.

Law, Criminal Law, Economics, The economics of crime, Philosophy Of Law, and 2 more

This is the first handout in a law and economics module that I (jointly) ran whilst at Keele University. The seminar introduced students to the core concepts of rationality and efficiency. These would be explored in s... more abstractThis is the first handout in a law and economics module that I (jointly) ran whilst at Keele University. The seminar introduced students to the core concepts of rationality and efficiency. These would be explored in specific legal settings later in the semester.

Economics, Philosophy Of Law, Law and Economics, Rationality, and Efficiency

This was the handout for a seminar I did on the goodness/badness of death and the value of life extension. It was for a group of medical ethics and law students. Although we did discuss life extension v replacement in... more abstractThis was the handout for a seminar I did on the goodness/badness of death and the value of life extension. It was for a group of medical ethics and law students. Although we did discuss life extension v replacement in the class, the handout focuses mainly on the classic arguments about the badness of death and the tedium of immortality.

Ethics, Death, Death & Dying (Thanatology), and Moral Philosophy

This is the handout for a session I ran on the philosophy of mental illness. It was for a group of medical ethics and law students. The purpose was to introduce them to some of the philosophy debates about the legitim... more abstractThis is the handout for a session I ran on the philosophy of mental illness. It was for a group of medical ethics and law students. The purpose was to introduce them to some of the philosophy debates about the legitimacy (or illegitimacy) of mental illness diagnoses.

Environmental Law and Sustainable Development

Publisher: HeinOnline

Publication Date: Jan 1, 2006

Publication Name: ISLR

Legal Reasoning and AI and the Law

Publisher: HeinOnline

Publication Date: Jan 1, 2007

Publication Name: ISLR

This is the ninth episode in the Algocracy and Transhumanism Podcast. In this episode I talk to Rachel O'Dwyer who is currently a postdoc at Maynooth University. We have a wide-ranging conversation about the digital c... more abstractThis is the ninth episode in the Algocracy and Transhumanism Podcast. In this episode I talk to Rachel O'Dwyer who is currently a postdoc at Maynooth University. We have a wide-ranging conversation about the digital commons, money, bitcoin and blockchain governance. We look at the historical origins of the commons, the role of money in human society, the problems with bitcoin and the creation of blockchain governance systems. You can download the podcast at this link. You can also listen below, or subscribe on Stitcher and iTunes (via RSS feed – just click add to iTunes).

Money, Credit, Digital Commons, Bitcoin, Blockchains, and 1 more

This is the tenth episode in the Algocracy and Transhumanism Podcast. In this episode John Danaher talks to David Gunkel. Gunkel is a professor of communication studies at Northern Illinois University. He specialises ... more abstractThis is the tenth episode in the Algocracy and Transhumanism Podcast. In this episode John Danaher talks to David Gunkel. Gunkel is a professor of communication studies at Northern Illinois University. He specialises in the philosophy and ethics of technology. He is the author of several books, including "Hacking Cyberspace," "The Machine Question" and "Of Remixology." In this podcast, Danaher talks with Gunkel about two main topics: (i) robot rights and responsibilities and (ii) the cyborgification of society.

Robotics, Algorithms, Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, Ethics, and 13 more